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Abstract. The Cossacks personified a “live border” in the southern Russian 
periphery (ukraina), one that maneuvered between the Muscovite state, the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Crimean Khanate, and the Nogai 
Horde. In the Field (Pole), where free and servant (sluzhilye) Cossacks came 
into contact, Russian military colonization moved south along Tatar routes 
(sakma) as part of an “expansion of defense” waged by Cossack bands, 
cordons, and fortresses. In the Time of Troubles in the early seventeenth 
century, Cossacks turned their expansion back toward Moscow, and the 
“live border” struck the capital. By sponsoring and supporting false tsars, 
Cossacks both disrupted and compelled the Muscovite state from 1605 to 
1611. They played a key role in Mikhail Romanov’s election, though a 
remarkable status reversal immediately occurred as a result: by swearing 
an oath to Romanov, the free Cossacks found themselves in the tsar’s 
service. 
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ЖИВАЯ ГРАНИЦА:  
КАЗАЧЬИ МАНЕВРЫ В ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ КОЛОНИЗАЦИИ 
(РУБЕЖ XVI–XVII ВВ.) 
 
Аннотация. Казаки олицетворяли «живую границу» на южнорусской 
украйне, маневрируя между Московским царством, Речью Посполитой, 
Крымским ханством и Ногайской ордой. В Поле, где сталкивались 
вольные и служилые казаки, русская военная колонизация 
продвигалась на юг вдоль татарских дорог (сакм) как «экспансия 
обороны» силами казачьих станиц, сторож и острогов. В Смуту начала 
XVII в. экспансия казаков повернула вспять, и «живая граница» 
захлестнула столицу. Выдвигая и поддерживая самозванцев, казаки за 
семь лет (1605–1611 гг.) разрушили и подчинили Московское царство. 
Они же сыграли ключевую роль в избрании Романова на царство, но 
тут же произошла статусная метаморфоза — присягнув своему 
избраннику, вольные казаки оказались на государевой службе.  
 
Ключевые слова: казаки, граница, колонизация, самозванство, 
Московское царство, украйна, Крым. 
 
 
In Russian, there still exists the old meaning of the word kazachit’ 
(“to cossack”): to live and serve on the side. For example, in the Pomor 
dialects, “to go to the Cossacks” means to go into seasonal labor, which 
does not exclude servitude. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
robbers of the ukraina (borderland), Tatars in the Russian service, 
homeless workers, runaway slaves, strangers, and others, were referred to 
as Cossacks. Cossacks of the Field implied freedom and willfulness. Some 
Cossacks were called “thieves,” others “servicemen,” although in fact their 
roles usually took turns. Since the rule of Tsar Peter, Cossacks formed a 
regular army and became faithful servants to their sovereign, often 
performing police functions. As we can see, the range of the Cossacks’ 
activities is impressively extensive, requiring high mobility and 
adaptability. The Cossack way of life does not only include war and 
robbery, but also a host of activities to ensure security, rapid exchange of 
information, livelihood, and, at times, prosperity. The Cossacks’ ability to 
perform a variety of independent and decisive action developed in the 









The Turkic word Cossack originally had the meaning a “runaway 
or wild horse” (Blagova 1970, 144–145). The Kipchak verb cazaclia (to 
wander, to live freely, to be a Cossack) meant the “temporary status of a 
swashbuckling fellow, seceded from his kin, who lived a warrior’s life in the 
wilderness” under the command of ataman, an “organizer of raids on close 
neighbors and campaigns to distant lands" (Kliashtornyi, Savinov 2005, 
58). Even khans who lost the struggle for power and were deprived of their 
lands could “go Cossack;” many khans and sultans had their “Cossacks 
days.” 
The first mention of the Cossacks in the Polovets Codex Cumanicus 
dictionary (1303) and Sugdan Synaxarion (1308) characterize them as 
“guards.” In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Armenians and Turks 
were listed among the Cossacks (guard troops) of Tana and Kaffa in 
Crimea, while Russian Cossacks appeared later (Karpov 2012). In the 
fifteenth century “Horde Cossacks” referred to Tatars who wandered 
regardless of the khans and made independent raids on Moscow’s domains 
(Gorskii 2005, 180). Cossacks (probably Tatars) are mentioned in the 
Crimean horde since 1474, in the Volga horde since 1492, in the Kazan 
khanate since 1491, in Astrakhan khanate since 1502, and in Azov since 
1499 (Sukhorukov 1903, 3). “The Tatars referred to as Cossacks the third 
and the lowest division of their army, which consisted of lancers, princes, 
and Cossacks” (Solov’ev 1989, 305). 
Since the time of Karamzin and Boltin it has been commonly believed 
that Russia borrowed the word Cossack from the Horde tax collectors, who 
rode across “Russian ulus” accompanied by Cossack guards. Tatar stems 
are found in Cossack military vocabulary: ataman (leader), esaul (assistant 
ataman), karaul (guard), ertaul (reconnaissance unit), seunch (news of the 
victory), and others. Cossacks are mentioned for the first time in Russia in 
1444, when they, along with the princely troops, drove Tatar Sultan 
Mustafa from Riazan’. These Cossacks could be Tatars from Sultan 
Qasim's entourage. In the Duchy of Moscow, “Gorodets Cossacks” were in 
the Kasimov princes’ retinues. In the fifteenth century Cossacks are 
mentioned more and more often, including the service of the Tatar nobility 
(for example, Satylgan, son of the Crimean Khan Meñli I Giray). 
N. M. Karamzin presented Don Cossacks as “people who speak our 
language, profess our faith, and whose countenances are a mixture of 
European and Asian features” (2003, vol. 2, 149–150). Among their 
atamans were Tatars who fit the Tatar-Russian tradition of “hordism” (see 
Golovnev 2015, 231–81). For example, in a 1549 letter to Ivan IV, the 
Nogai Prince Iusuf mentions Saryazman: “Thy serf, a certain man called 
Saryazman, built forts on the Don in three or four places, and he 
ambushes our ambassadors and other people who go up to you and back, 
captures them, and beats some to death... That same year our people, 
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after trading in Rus’, were returning back, and on the Voronezh one of thy 
people—named Saryazman—thy rogue, came and took them.” The Tatars 
were a part of the Don Cossacks even later. For example, in 1589 a 
baptized Crimean Tatar went to the Don and served the sovereign of 
Moscow there for fifteen years: “... the people of the Crimea he defeated 
and to the Crimean people and ulus brought war with the Don Cossacks, 
then from the Don went to Putivl’” (Kliuchevskii 1988, 100). 
It is paradoxical that the Russian border against the Tatars was 
being constructed by the Tatars themselves. While the actions of some 
Tatars (Horde, Crimean) sparked the need for greater defense, other Tatars 
(Moscow, Kasimov) helped to construct this defense. The first barrage on 
the Oka was established by Tatar princes under Vasilii the Dark and 
supplemented by regular mounted reconnaissance (ertaul) under Vasilii III. 
Initially it was technically mobile and mounted, which resulted in the 
appearance of the frontier Cossacks. Cossacks represented a “live frontier,” 
which they guarded, inhabited, crossed, violated, and, ultimately, 
personified. The steppe borderland was so extensive and politically tense 
that every once in a while an independent polity arose (horde, principality, 
sich). To some extent, these border communities copied the foundations of 
surrounding powers and mixed them in their practical use. 
The main factor in the formation of the Muscovite borders in the 
south was Crimea, which raided Muscovy and in parallel encouraged her 
independent policy.1 It was largely Crimea that created the Field as a large 
and restless borderland, and it was the confrontation with Crimea that 
gave rise to the “live border” of Russia:  Cossacks. In the sixteenth century 
Crimean Tatars raided Muscovy with meticulous regularity, considering 
steppe and forest steppe between the Dnieper and the Don their summer 
camping grounds. Protection against the Tatars was mainly 
reconnaissance along major roads, especially the Muravskii Trail that led 
from the Crimean Perekop to Tula. The growth and movement of the “live 
border” can be seen in the tactics of defending Moscow from the Horde 
raids. 
Cossacks and servicemen at the border settlements and outposts 
kept watch over Tatar trails in the sixteenth century. They guarded the 
ridge (prairie watersheds), roads, river crossings, and also raided the 
steppe and seized “tongues,” i.e. captives who could reveal valuable 
information (Liubavskii 1996, 297). The deeper the Cossack exploration, 
the more alarming were the Tatars’ own raids, for skillful reconnaissance 
could turn their raid into a roundup, the only thing that seriously scared 
the nomads. 
Unlike the nomadic hordes producing fast patrols around it, Russian 
military organization was territorial, and Russian patrols needed fortified 
                                                 
1 According to N. M. Karamzin, friendship between Ivan III and the Crimean Khan Meñli I 
Giray, “hastened the death of the Grand, or the Golden Horde and distracted the forces of 
Poland, clearly contributing to the greatness of Russia” (Karamzin, 2003, vol. 1, 693). 
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outposts. Each new fort, with its network of villages and watchtowers, was 
a step toward a more profound defense, and the consistent promotion of 
forts along the trails toward Tatars marked the advance of military 
colonization. Reconnaissance patrols prepared the grounds for a new fort, 
which became an outpost of defense and support for further movement 
along the high road. In the middle of the sixteenth century the advance of 
military colonization marked itself on the upper Oka along the Muravskii 
Trail by Dedilov (1553), Bolkhov (1556) and Orеl (1566) fortresses, and in 
the upper reaches of the Don along the Nogai Trail by Shatsk (1553) and 
Dankov (1563) fortresses. At first a newly made fort served as a military 
camp, which had a stockade, a rampart, and a moat. Within a few years, 
after subduing the neighborhood, the fort developed into a town of log 
buildings. The fort’s garrison was commanded by a golova (warchief), the 
town garrison by a voevodа (warlord). A. I. Papkov followed the sequence of 
the synchronous events in the Field and in Siberia in the 1590s (2004, 81). 
Thus, initially the colonization of the southern Russian borderland 
had defensive motives. This tactic of increasing defense was largely 
spontaneous, as each fort immediately released a network of outposts. In 
turn, these outposts, in controlling the new sites of the Field, found 
advantageous positions for more supporting points where they prepared 
places for new forts. As a result, through moving the outposts toward the 
enemy, military (mostly Cossack) colonization of the Field carried on. Step 
by step, following the reconnaissance units, the live border crept south, 
widening and strengthening its rear with new settlements. 
However, the expansion of the borders of Muscovy was not a mere 
involuntary “expansion of defense.” Ivan III already claimed to return the 
possessions of Riurik, including Novgorod and Lithuanian lands, and Ivan 
IV considered himself the heir of the king’s (khan’s) right to possess the 
Tatar lands. Cossacks as a live border were very responsive to the 
monarchy’s condition and mood, at times pulling away from her, at times 
protecting her, at times paving her way. 
 
А Precarious Ukraina 
 
After the Mongol invasion, the world turned upside down. The 
southern borders of Russia became the northern edge of the Horde. 
Borderland steppe and forest remained an edge, but of another 
metropolitan area. In this era, the Tatars possessed the ukraina 
(borderland), using it as pastureland for their herds with small agricultural 
inclusions (e.g. Bolokhov land), thus provisioning the Horde. With the 
collapse of the Khanate, ukraina became a territory of rivalry and 
contention, claimed in one way or another by not only the nomadic hordes, 
but also Lithuania, Moscow, Poland, Hungary, and Moldavia. The 
surrounding powers tried to include the South-Russian borderland in their 
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orbits, not as an independent country, but as a field of competitive 
strategies and cross colonization. 
Essentially the South-Russian borderland represented the 
converging margins of neighboring countries, and the diversity of this 
borderland (ukraina) communities reflected these cross-border contacts. 
For example, Galicia was predominantly a Lithuanian-Polish region, 
Transcarpathia—Hungarian (the so-called Hungarian Ukraine), Budjak—
Turkish (Budjak Cossacks served Turkey up to 1808), Sloboda—Russian 
(though with a heavy Circassian component). In 1546 the governor of 
Putivl’ Prince Mikhailo Troekurov informed the Grand Duke: “Now, sire, 
there are a great many Cossacks and Circassians and Kiyans in the Field, 
and your people, sir, went to the field from all of the ukrainas” (cited in 
Sukhorukov 1903, 3). The composition of the Cossacks shows the 
dominance of one or another state in the Field: in the fifteenth century 
Tatar Cossacks dominated, while in the sixteenth century they were ousted 
by Ukrainian (Lithuanian) and Russian (Moscow) Cossacks. 
Geographically, the Cossacks who filled the steppes between the 
Carpathians and the Altai with the decline of the Horde can be divided into 
three distinct ethnic areas: (1) Russian on the Don; (2) Ukrainian on the 
Dnieper; and (3) Turkic in Crimea, Azov, the Kipchak steppe, and 
Transoxiana. The first formed the Russian Cossacks, the second—the 
Zaporizhian and Ukrainian, and the third (between Aral and Balkhash)—
the Kazakhs. Terek and Greben Cossacks, who appeared in the late 
sixteenth century, joined Kabardians, Chechens, Kumyk, Nogai, 
Georgians, Armenians, and Circassians (see Blagova 1970; Averin 2003, 
118–119). 
Cossack community only looked monolithic, but inside was a melting 
pot of different mannerisms, interests, and ideas. With its outcast and 
rebellious origins, Cossack freemen often provoked conflicts. Due to their 
border location, the Cossacks focused on conflict in their outside affairs, 
delving into the controversy and intrigue between neighboring powers, 
turning to one side, then to another, or even to multiple sides at a time. 
This turbulence formed a sort of borderland mentality, in which maneuver 
prevailed over consistency. The Cossacks could serve several rulers at 
once, easily changing allies and enemies. This did not reflect a 
precariousness in their views, but rather the realities of border life. 
According to A. I. Papkov, in the late sixteenth century Russians and 
Ukrainians, “collided in the Field as the subjects of warring states.” These 
two streams of the Field’s colonization, Russian and Ukrainian, were 
distinguished by the fact that “Russian colonization was predominantly 
governmental and relied on government-built town-forts and armies 
forming in the region,” while its Ukrainian counterpart was spontaneous, 
in part supported by Polish landowners, with the state involved primarily 
to prevent the resettlement of Circassians (Papkov 2004, 91, 109). 
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Other habits and actions of Russian and Ukrainian Cossacks 
complemented rather than contrasted with each other. This also applies to 
the particular Cossack business of freelance service to the rulers of 
neighboring countries, including Moscow, the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, Turkey, Crimea, and the Nogai khanate. This service 
provided income and conveniently allowed them to use the name of the 
ruler for their own robbers’ profits. At the same time Cossacks created a 
kind of circular threat, being both their defender and assailant: while one 
branch of the Cossacks indulged in robbery in the steppes of the Dnieper, 
the Don, and the Iaik, and was dubbed “thieves,” another part was listed 
as “servicemen” and chased the thieves. 
In the borderline colonization of Muscovy, robber soldiers engaged in 
“plowing” other states’ boundaries, after which the sovereign’s people 
settled the area, bringing their own orders and forcing the Cossacks and 
Circassians to distant “virgin” borders (e.g. Siberia). Muscovy used 
Cossacks for crashing borders, while professing her noninvolvement in the 
robberies of her good neighbors: the Porte, the Crimean Khanate, and the 
Nogai Horde. 
Adventurism, daring, agility, and marginality of “borderland people” 
together gave a strong impetus to colonization. Cossacks, even as outcasts 
and rebels, were a kind of byproduct of the country and communicated 
with her. The more rogues the country expelled, the vaster borderline 
territories they assimilated. Crossing the border, “the odd men” made way 
for the state to follow. Thus the internal tensions in the country stimulated 
expansion. At the same time, another tendency developed: the sprawling 
frontier harbored seeds of turmoil. 
 
Time of Troubles 
 
By the seventeenth century the Cossack border surrounding 
Muscovy on all sides was not just live, but also swollen. The freemen on 
the Dnieper, the Don, the Volga, and the Iaik significantly expanded the 
geography of their raids. In the 1580s Volga and Iaik Cossacks pressed the 
Nogai Horde, founding the town of Uralsk in 1584. Meanwhile, part of the 
Don Cossacks moved to Terek, forming the Terek army, while a portion of 
the Volga Cossacks moved to the Stroganovs Urals and then to Siberia. On 
the southern Russian borderlands the freemen formed a powerful Cossack 
zone bonded by steppe roads, including Hetman Trail between the Dnieper 
and the Don. 
Under Boris Godunov, Cossacks were forbidden to appear in Russian 
towns and cities, especially in Moscow, and those who violated the 
“commandment” were put in jail (Sukhorukov 1903, 64; Stanislavskii 
1990, 16). Cossacks posed a threat for both the state and the state’s 
enemies. Some independent quasi-polities developed in the Field among 
the Cossacks and the Don people, who gained some experience in raids on 
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neighboring countries and “smelled power.” Cossacks of the Dnieper, the 
Don, and the Urals were tied to Muscovy and to each other through 
Orthodoxy, but they still clearly separated themselves from the Muscovites 
and would not abjure robbery of Russian villages and Orthodox 
monasteries. 
Borderland freemen had freedom of maneuver, including in politics. 
Cossacks gained experience in alternate or simultaneous service in 
Muscovy, Poland, Turkey, and the Horde. Contrasting themselves to the 
state, they learned to play with authority and power. However, they 
regarded the game of power as a kind of adventure full of excitement and 
daring. Hence, it is no mere coincidence that Cossacks were the main 
players in the impostors’ game. 
Historians have long paid attention to the special role of Cossacks in 
the nomination and support of impostors. According to A. L. Stanislavskii, 
“one of the most active estates that participated in the social struggle of 
the Time of Troubles, was the Cossacks” (1990, 2). R. G. Skrynnikov has 
noted “the importance of the participation of the Zaporizhian Cossacks in 
the initial stage of False Dmitrii’s campaign against Moscow” (1997, 389–
400). According to A. I. Papkov, “the population of the borderline 
supported the impostor.” He writes, “Circassians, as a rule, were the 
soldiers of the Pretender or of the Commonwealth” (2004, 111–114, 129). 
According to I. O. Tiumentsev, “the local Cossacks stood at the origins of 
impostors’ intrigue in the northwest, southwest, and south.” He notes that 
“False Dmitrii III, as well as False Peter, False Dmitrii II, etc., was a typical 
‘Cossack pretender’” (2010, 120–121). Hungarian specialist in Russian 
studies D. Svak is the most resolute about the relationship between 
imposture and the Cossacks: “I argue that the phenomenon of imposture 
was not only supported by the Cossacks in the course of its operation, but 
was a primarily Cossack invention at the time of its occurrence... The bulk 
of the social base for the impostors was always the Cossacks, who 
themselves were willing to put forth their false prince... The Cossacks 
needed the impostors... and did not hesitate to promote from their own 
ranks” (2010, 47–52). 
Imposture is considered a historical curiosity and a painful reaction 
to the tyranny of Ivan the Terrible by the people of Muscovy. K. V. Chistov 
sees it as a fulfillment of a people’s utopia, the myth of the return of the 
king-deliverer (1967, 29). However, we can also look at it as a trick of the 
borderland people. If Muscovy subjects were inclined to believe in the 
absurd, the borderland people were the generator of this absurdity, which 
turned the idea of ghost kings into a technique. 
Future False Dmitrii I, after escaping from the capital, was met with 
enthusiasm in the borderline. Prior to this moment the impostor had 
unsuccessfully sought support from the head of the Polish Orthodox Party 
Prince K. Ostrog, then with the chief of the Arians Pan G. Goiskii, and 
finally in liaisons among the Ukrainian and Don Cossacks. It was the 
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Cossacks who saw Grigorii Otrep’ev as “the red sun,” the true tsar 
returning like risen Christ. During its march to Moscow, False Dmitrii’s 
army grew through the addition of Cossacks. At Sevsk he was joined by a 
unit of 12,000 Don Cossacks. In an emergency, after suffering a defeat by 
Muscovy troops, the impostor took refuge behind the walls of Putivl’, and it 
was again the Ukrainian and Don Cossacks who kept him from fleeing to 
Poland. However, False Dmitrii entered Moscow with a retinue of boyars 
and the Poles, awarding and releasing the Cossacks back home. Lingering 
Cossacks “irritated Muscovites” with their arrogance: “they showed a clear 
contempt and referred to the locals scornfully as Jews [zhydy].”2 
“Emperor Demetrius” (Demetreus Imperator) did not forget the 
ukraina’s merit and canceled taxes for a decade in southern Russia, which 
caused grumbling in other areas of Muscovy, Cossacks in their own way 
patronized the impostor, taking care of his family and giving birth to the 
tsar’s “nephew” Peter (a never existing son of Fedor Ivanovich).3 False Peter 
was more an elect of the Cossack circle than an impostor. For the role of 
the false prince, Terek Cossack ataman Fedor Bodyrin had his eye on two 
young chura Cossacks (servants):  the son of a Murom townsman Ileika 
and the son of an Astrakhan strelets Mitia.4 The circle selected Ileika 
Muromets because he had been in Moscow and had an epic nickname. 
Prior to joining the Terek Cossacks Ileika was the runaway serf Korovin, an 
illegitimate orphan, a cook on merchant ships, and a seller of apples and 
shoes at the Astrakhan market. Ataman Bodyrin’s trick, according to 
interrogations, was intended to summon Cossack payment assigned by the 
merciful tsar and detained by wicked boyars: “And so it was said among 
Cossacks: ‘The Sire, he wished to grant us, but the evil nobles, they spend 
our payment, so they do not give us our earnings’” (Perri 2010, 69). The 
circle notified False Dmitrii about his “nephew Peter” and in response 
received the order for the “nephew” and his mates “to go to Moscow in 
haste.” En route, at Sviiazhsk, the Cossacks caught news of the murder of 
the pretender in Moscow on May 17, 1606. False Peter himself assured 
that he arrived in Moscow the day after the death of False Dmitrii,  
on May 18. 
Ataman Bodyrin’s statement provides a motive for the march to 
Moscow “for the tribute.” Apparently, it was not even the delayed payment 
(although the Cossacks “incessantly” demanded it), but claims to 
participate in managing the affairs and wealth of Muscovy. False Dmitrii, 
who was obligated to the Cossacks for his accession, left them behind, 
                                                 
2 Sukhorukov 1903, 68; Stanislavskii 1990, 20. 
3 According to the Terek Cossacks, Tsar Fedor and Tsarina Irina had a son, Peter, who at 
birth was changed for daughter Feodosiia (see Sukhorukov 1903, 68). 
4 The word “chura” was adopted by Cossacks from the Tatar word for “servant” or “junior 
mate” (Stanislavskii 1990, 8). 
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indulging instead in relationships with the Moscow nobility and the Poles. 
The Cossacks needed Prince Peter to remind Tsar Dmitrii of his “kinship” 
obligations and gain access to Moscow. 
With the death of False Dmitrii, Ileika-Peter again became an orphan. 
The former scenario exhausted, the group around Vasilii Shuiskii seized 
power in Moscow and cursed the impostor. Ataman Bodyrin remained out 
of the game, and False Peter was picked up by a new group of 
conspirators, “thieving nobles,” who were in opposition to Shuiskii. Putivl’ 
voivode Prince Grigorii Shakhovskoi spread the word that Tsar Dmitrii 
escaped, sheltered False Peter, and let the Terek and Volga Cossacks who 
rushed to his aid into town. Ivan Bolotnikov’s army also began to form in 
Putivl’, while in Poland, the search for another False Dmitrii continued. 
Meanwhile, the Cossack borderland continued to spawn new false 
princes. Only three “princes” showed up in Astrakhan in summer 1606:  
Ivan Avgust, Lavr, and Osinovik, but by spring 1607 their number 
increased to a dozen (the Don, the Volga, the Terek and Zaporozh'e 
settlements saw “princes” Fеdor, Klementii, Savelii, Semen, Vasilii, 
Eroshka, Gavrilka, Martynka). The “children and grandchildren” of Ivan 
the Terrible seemed even more numerous as imposture became a trend 
among the Cossacks. “False kinghood” was not just a fun, but also a new 
business for the Cossacks at that time; now the bordermen made 
predatory raids in the name of the tsar. In addition, the Cossack 
“polyarchy” ideologically became the token of their superiority over the 
kingdom. In fact, what Cossacks claimed was not the “legitimacy” of false 
princes, as some law-abiding historians have argued, but rather the 
establishment of the Wild Field law in lawless Muscovy. 
The Don ataman Ivan Zarutskii, by faking the Putivl’ oath (with the 
participation of Starodub) to the next pretender, False Dmitrii II, 
accompanied him to Moscow (Tushino). The price of this Cossack triumph 
“was the fact that the Polish-Lithuanian and Cossack bandit gangs 
virtually divided the empire among themselves” (Svak 2010, 44). Cossack 
“princes” (first Fedor, then Ivan Avgust and Lavrentii) hurried to join their 
“uncle,” who at first welcomed them, then “ordered them whipped,” 
“thrown into jail” and executed. Later the same fate befell seven other 
borderland impostors. Hetman Prince Roman Rozhinskii exposed and 
executed the “princes” and passed their troops to Cossack voivodes Ivan 
Zarutskii and Aleksander Lisovskii. 
By the end of his reign, False Dmitrii II almost completely relied on 
the Cossacks, unleashing the massacre of Polish prisoners, who were 
drowned according to the Cossack tradition in bags “in sack and in water.” 
At the same time the Cossacks were scattered throughout Muscovy, 
receiving villages and towns from the impostor “to feed on.” In October 
1608 ataman K. Miliaev collected wine from the royal villages near 
Pereiaslavl’; in January 1609 “Volodimer was given to Cossacks to feed 
on;” and in 1611 many taverns in Riazan’ uezd were leased to Cossacks, 
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and Solovetskii monastery accepted the service of seventy “martial 
Cossacks” led by two atamans (Stanislavskii 1990, 27, 30, 47, 82). 
Shortly after the death of False Dmitrii II, False Dmitrii III, “the thief 
of Pskov,” appeared, this time in the north of Russia, but under the same 
Cossack scenario. “The new delusion” was started by a Cossack (or the son 
of a deacon, bound to the Cossacks) Sidorka, who traded knives in Velikii 
Novgorod, and in spring 1611 entered the city with “a hundred mounted 
mates in debauchery,” “thieves and rogues like himself,” and declared 
himself once again “the miraculously survived Tsar Dmitrii.” The people of 
Novgorod reacted to the miracle rather coldly and the party of “Novgorod 
Cossack scum” moved to Ivangorod, where they were “regaled with salute 
and celebrations for many days” (Tiumentsev 2010, 119–120). 
Thus, in seven years (1605–1611) free Cossacks conquered Muscovy, 
promoting and supporting impostors and subjugating the country. In the 
Time of Troubles the Don was depopulated; all the Cossacks moved to 
Moscow. As noted by M. K. Liubavskii, Don freemen “poured into the 
Muscovite state as long as sovereignty there decomposed and the Troubles 
began. Cossacks dispersed across the inland areas of the country and the 
Don... lay empty” (1996, 314). Advancing and supporting false tsars and 
princes, Cossacks marched across Muscovy. Under False Dmitrii I they 
entrenched Putivl’, under False Peter they entered Tula, under False 
Dmitrii II they came to Moscow, and under False Dmitrii III they reached 
Pskov. 
 
Return to the Borderland 
 
Romanovs owe their elevation to the Troubles. Filaret became 
Metropolitan in Rostov under False Dmitrii I, and the patriarch under 
False Dmitrii II. S. F. Platonov did not rule out the possibility that Filaret 
Romanov, along with his brethren and relatives, was no stranger to the 
intrigues of imposture. Not without reason at the time G. Otrep’ev “lived in 
the Romanovs’ estate” (1910, 233–234). The “Tushino patriarch” led the 
embassy, which offered Muscovy to the Catholic Wladislaw. The patriarch’s 
son Mikhail Romanov was among the boyars who swore allegiance to “Tsar 
Vladislav.” 
The election of Mikhail to the throne was another triumph for the 
Cossacks. It was the Cossacks who surrounded Moscow with 
encampments and who rejected applicants of royal blood, such as the 
Polish Prince Wladyslaw (already proclaimed as the Russian tsar) and the 
Swedish Duke Charles Philip (advocated by Prince Pozharskii). After the 
murder of Procopii Liapunov on July 22, 1611, Cossack troops captured 
Moscow. On the eve of the Zemskii Sobor there were far more of them in 
Moscow than the nobility (over ten thousand). “Cossacks walked in 
Moscow in crowds,” according to “The Story of the Zemskii Sobor in 1613.” 
On the day of the election, February 21, 1613, the Cossacks set a 
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“maidan” in Moscow, burst into the Council Hall, and insisted on the 
election of Mikhail: “the Cossacks and the mob did not depart from the 
Kremlin until the Duma and zemstvo officials swore allegiance on the same 
day.” On April 13, 1613, Swedish scouts reported from Moscow that the 
Cossacks elected Mikhail Romanov against the boyars’ will, forcing 
Trubetskoi and Pozharskii to consent to the nomination after a siege of 
their households. Jacques Margeret wrote to King James I in 1613 that the 
Cossacks chose “this child” to manipulate him and that the majority of 
Russian society would be pleased to welcome the English army, as it had 
been living in constant fear of the Cossacks (see Stanislavskii 1990,  
84–89). The Poles had every reason to call Mikhail Romanov a “Cossack 
protégé.” Essentially Mikhail was the same type of a “Cossack tsar” as 
False Dmitrii, except for the fact that he was approved by the Sobor. 
The election of Mikhail Romanov was the peak in power for the 
bordermen in Muscovy. However, it was also the moment of 
metamorphosis in the status of free Cossacks. Sworn to their chosen one, 
they suddenly found themselves “at the service of the sovereign.” Mikhail 
called for the liberators of Moscow to show their “initial service and zeal” 
and promised to endow them “according to... their service.” In 1613 the 
Cossack order was created and the Moscow government began to convert 
the free Cossacks into “instrumental” servicemen with permanent 
residence, for example in Putivl’ or Oskol. The tsar’s charter was sent to 
the Don, “brimming with tenderness and praise,” which encouraged the 
Cossacks “to stand up for tsar, country and Orthodox faith.” The tsar’s 
banner was soon sent to the Don Cossacks to approve “their zeal for 
Russia.”5 
The decline of the Cossack freedom is delineated in the fate of 
ataman Ivan Zarutskii. Ally of the three “Tsar Dmitriis”, he came to 
Moscow with the False Dmitrii I, served as a voivode to False Dmitrii II, 
and swore allegiance to the False Dmitrii III. According to R. G. 
Skrynnikov, Zarutskii possessed all the qualities of the popular leader, 
impressing contemporaries with his handsomeness, intelligence, and 
courage (1987, 198). It is not clear, however, what people he was the 
leader of. Zarutskii was born in Galicia, spent his childhood in Turkish 
slavery, and became an ataman on the Don, voivode and boyar in 
Muscovy. Russian historiography describes him as vacillating, if not 
politically omnivorous (due to his switched loyalties from False Dmitrii II to 
Żółkiewski, then to Liapunov, False Dmitrii III, and hetman Chodkiewicz). 
However, in the chaos of the Troubles the previous government was gone 
and its confused and scattered “people” was tormented by different 
leaders. Zarutskii headed and represented the Cossacks as a military 
leader and a strong force during the Troubles, and was a consistent 
supporter of the Cossack idea of imposture. Faithful to this idea, he 
                                                 
5 Sukhorukov 1903, 76–82; Stanislavskii 1990, 8, 19, 91–96. 
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considered it “service to the people.” In this sense, he did his duty 
responsibly. He took under his guardianship (and to his bed) the widow of 
two False Dmitriis Marina Mniszek and her baby son Ivan (the “Little 
Thief”).6 As one of the leaders of the first militia Zarutskii, on the behalf of 
the Cossacks, opposed the zemstvo, and defeated and killed its leader 
Liapunov. As the second militia leader, he lost his position to Prince 
Dmitrii Pozharskii and then the Sobor election of the tsar, where he 
unsuccessfully supported the Little Thief in opposition to Mikhail 
Romanov. However, no one knew at that time that Romanov’s fate would 
be very different from that of the other “Trouble elects” (Godunov, Shuiskii, 
False Dmitrii, Wladislaw). Chased by Riazan’ troops under voivode Miron 
Veliaminov and the Tatar army under Sviiazhsk Prince Aklym Tugushev, 
the ataman retreated to the ukraina, losing Cossack villages behind him. 
Hiding first in Astrakhan, then on the Iaik, Zarutskii counted on continued 
Cossack unrest and support from Nogai. However, Moscow returned to 
power, and ataman Zarutskii remained in limbo. In the summer of 1614 he 
was captured, brought to Moscow, and impaled; and Little Thief was 
hanged. 
The defeat of ataman Zarutskii signaled the retreat of the Cossacks, 
or rather their return to normal. After the death of False Dmitrii III and 
disappearance of False Dmitrii IV, imposture seemed exhausted, or rather 
subsided together with the Cossacks to the borderline from which it had 
come from.7 In the following decades impostors appeared infrequently and 
outside Russia. In the 1630–40s Ivan Luba and Ivan Vergun, both under 
the name of “Prince Ivan” (son of False Dmitrii II and Marina Mniszek) 
showed up in Poland and Turkey; two “sons” of Vasilii Shuiskii also 




In world history, Russia probably holds the first place in imposture. 
However, not only Muscovy was affected by this at the turn of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. False kings showed up on the other side of 
Europe: False Sebastians in Portugal, false hospodars in Moldova (Svak 
2010, 48–49). Nowhere else, however, was the avalanche of imposture so 
strong and devastating as in Muscovy, and a major role in this drama was 
played by Cossacks. The collapse of central power sowed confusion among 
the subject people, while untying the hands of independent people, and the 
Cossack anarchy turned into quasi-monarchy. In the turmoil of a political 
                                                 
6 Malicious rumors suggested that the father of the “prince” was Zarutskii himself. According 
to other rumors, the ataman famously combined eroticism and politics, at a difficult time 
offering the widow to the harem of Nogai murza Iashterek. 
7 Another “Tsar Dmitrii” appeared in 1611 in Astrakhan, the fourth in the row of false tsars; 
he was accepted as the tsar in the lower Volga, but disappeared in early 1612. 
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crisis rogues always take the advantage of law-abiding citizens due to self-
organization, even in its “rogue” form. In the Troubles of the early 
seventeenth century, the Cossack expansion turned inland, and the “live 
border” swept the capital. 
In political terms, a large borderland is pregnant with great turmoil. 
In colonization bordermen sometimes exhibit unexpected ambition. 
Cossacks, recent rogues, in the Troubles felt themselves the arbiters of the 
fate of the metropolis, creators of new kingdoms, and conquerors of new 
spaces. “The live border” became a quasi-monarchy, spawning a polyarchy. 
Cossacks invented kings for Muscovy and played with power far beyond its 
borders. We can only guess who they pretended to be in the Siberian and 
Iaik yurts. However, large gains are impossible without big ambitions, and 
imposture syndrome did not only become a satellite of the Troubles, but 
also the stimulus for expansion. 
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